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Ab s t r a c t
"^F^ he article deals with a group of Soviet philosophers (active primarily in the 1960s and 1970s) 
X  who sought a non-dogmatic, innovative interpretation of Marxism. The key figures were 
Evald Ilyenkov (1924-1979), Felix Mikhailov (1930-2006) and Genrikh Batishchev (1932-1990). 
Drawing on the recently published writings of “early” Marx that dealt with subjects going beyond 
the official tenets of dialectical and historical materialism, they (1) attempted to reconsider the 
concept of the ideal, seeking to amend its status within the doctrine, (2) stressed the fundamental 
difference between the natural and the social and hence the irreducibility of the latter to the for­
mer, (3) emphasised activism as man’s essential quality; (4) and, first and foremost, came with an 
ingenious hypothesis of the origins of consciousness.
Consciousness was to them the product of communication mediated by the use of tools (col­
lective work) that served as a kind of material (stone) “protoconcepts” symbolising both the rele­
vant extrinsic properties of the objects of work and the relevant common practices, i. e. socialised 
properties, of workers. Insofar as they were instrumental in presenting the self in an objective 
form, tools, or rather the socialised use of them, proved crucial to the development of self-con­
sciousness, differentiation between self and non-self, overcoming of the natural solipsist attitude 
and acquirement of objective knowledge, the latter allowing to transcend the limits of natural life 
and engage in free activity and creativity.
Кey  w ords: alienation; consciousness; ideal; praxis; Marxism.
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А н Н О Т А Ц И Я
Статья посвящена группе советских философов, выступивших в 1960-1970-е годы с но­ваторской, недогматической интерпретаций марксизма. Ключевыми фигурами этой 
школы советской марксистской мысли были Эвальд Ильенков (1924-1979), Феликс Тро­
фимов (1930-2006) и Генрих Батищев (1932-1990). Отталкиваясь от сочинений «раннего» 
Маркса, посвященных проблемам, выходившим за рамки официозного марксизма, они 1) 
подвергли переосмыслению категорию идеального с целью изменения ее статуса в фило­
софии марксизма; 2) подчеркивали сущностное отличие социального от природного, не- 
сводимость первого ко второму и 3) деятельностную сущность человека; 4) выдвинули ори­
гинальную гипотезу происхождения сознания.
Сознание понималось ими как продукт коллективного действия, опосредованного ору­
диями труда, которые выступают как своего рода материальные (каменные) «протопо­
нятия», «отражающие», с одной стороны, объективные свойства предметов, на которые 
направлены коллективные трудовые усилия, с другой стороны, формы взаимодействия 
трудящихся, т. е. общественной практики. Представляя субъект действия (еще не осознан­
ное «Я») в объективной форме, орудия труда, вернее, их коллективное использование, сы­
грали решающую роль в развитии самосознания, различении Я и не-Я, преодолении есте­
ственной солипсистской установки и обретении объективного знания, что, в свою очередь, 
сделало возможным выход за границы природного бытия в сферу свободного действия и 
творчества.
К л ю ч ев ы е слова: идеальное; марксизм; отчуждение; практика; сознание.
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Introduction. The name used to identify the 
group of philosophers I am concerned with in this 
paper is, of course, controversial. Not only has it 
been applied earlier to various Western thinkers, 
such as Adorno and Marcuse or Djilas and even 
Sartre, with whom my men have little in common. 
Even more important is the fact that they would 
have strongly objected to being called Neomarxists 
themselves. For they doubtless considered them­
selves true though, by no means, dogmatic Marx­
ists. However, they were not recognised as such 
by the Soviet philosophical establishment. To call 
them “Late Soviet Marxists” would be more ade­
quate, perhaps, but for the risk of “dissolving” them 
in a multitude too amorphous to be meaningful.
Discovering “Early” Marx. Among other ben­
efits of Khrushchev thaw of the late 1950s -  early 
1960s, less conspicuous, perhaps, but of lasting 
consequences, was reviviscence of creative phil­
osophical thought. The privileged status of Marx­
ism as the only true, and still the one officially 
permitted, ideology was preserved, to be sure, but 
this unrivalled and unchallenged Weltanschau­
ung acquired new energetic followers -  eager to 
exercise what they sincerely believed to be its cre­
ative potential and ready for its non-dogmatic, in­
novative interpretation. Their recognised leader 
was Evald Ilyenkov (1924-1979) whose Dialectics 
of the Abstract and the Concrete in Marx’s Capi­
tal (1960) [4] was seen as a major breakthrough, 
followed by On Idols and Ideals (1968) [2] and 
The Dialectical Logic (1974, reprinted 1984) [3]. 
Other key figures were Felix Mikhailov (1930­
2006), author of The Riddle of the Self (1964) [10] 
and Genrikh Batishchev (1932-1990, the princi­
pal publication: The Activistic Essence of Man as 
a Philosophical Principle, 1969 [1]).
The ideological justification for their effort was 
the recently discovered “early” Marx of Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 [5] and The 
German Ideology [7] (1845-46), to which were 
added Economic Manuscripts of 1857-61 [8] (the 
so called original version of Das Kapital). These 
writings, first published in the 1930s or even as 
late as 1959 and hence unknown not only to the 
patriarchs of Russian Marxism Plekhanov and 
Lenin but even to the hitherto principal Soviet 
Marxist authority Stalin, dealt with subjects that 
appeared unconventional and even alien to the 
official tenets of dialectical and historical materi­
alism, moreover -  or worse still -  already invoked 
by “bourgeois” or “revisionist” philosophers, such
as Existentialists and the Frankfurt school. Soviet 
Neomarxists welcomed them, nevertheless, as a 
singular insight into the origins of Marxism and 
an opportunity for its deeper understanding and 
better substantiation as well as its incorporation 
into the European humanist tradition.
Rehabilitation of the Ideal. The departure 
point of the new school was re-interpretation of 
the ideal. According to Ilyenkov, the ideal should 
not be (as “militant materialism” was inclined to 
do) belittled as an inferior “secondary” element. It 
is, essentially, the rational form of human activity 
and, as such, the principal concern and the fun­
damental problem of philosophy. The essential 
characteristic of human activity is man’s ability 
to adapt its behaviour to (“to act in accord” with) 
any “extraneous form”, moreover, “in accord” 
with this extraneous form’s potential changes. 
This ability is due to a unique human capacity 
that Ilyenkov called productive imagination. The 
latter is a capacity to operate not only with exter­
nal objects (a faculty we share with animals), but 
also with their ideal models.
Insofar as such activity to be effective (suc­
cessful) is to be “subdued” to the specific qualities 
of external objects, the ontological priority of be­
ing (matter) as the principal tenet of philosophi­
cal materialism remains unchallenged (not a mi­
nor point under Soviet circumstances), but con­
sciousness is no longer seen as primarily a passive 
“reflection” of the external reality, but rather as a 
prerequisite and an instrument of reality’s trans­
formation into forms it lacks in its initial (sponta­
neous, natural) state.
The Natural and the Social. In this way a new 
type of reality (being) emerges, which, although 
resting on a natural foundation, cannot be de­
scribed in natural terms nor accounted for by 
natural laws alone. It were repeated attempts to 
reduce this transnatural reality to the purely nat­
ural that rendered pre-Marxist materialism easy 
prey to criticism by idealist philosophers. (Sovi­
et Neomarxists were fond of citing Lenin on this 
point who once observed that “clever material­
ism”, by which he presumably meant his own ver­
sion thereof, was closer to “clever idealism” than 
it was to “silly materialism”). The genius of Marx, 
they held, consisted in demonstrating in a com­
prehensive and convincing way that the newness 
of social novelties (both with regard to the natu­
ral and with regard to their own previous forms), 
i.e. their irreducibility to the already existing (the
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“given”), was in principle compatible with them 
being objectively conditioned, i.e., in Marxist jar­
gon, “material”. The key to this dialectical enigma 
was the concept of material production, which 
was broadly interpreted by Soviet Neomarxists as 
the objective material activity transforming the 
world, alias “practice”.
Activism as Man’s Essential Quality. Prac­
tice is another category of “early” Marx, central in 
his Theses on Feuerbach (1845, published 1888) 
[7] and critical for his understanding of man as 
a transnatural, historic being. With Neomarx- 
ists practice, in fact, replaces matter as the cen­
tral philosophical category; it serves as a kind of 
substantia of the social, like pre-Marxist materi­
alism saw matter as the substantia of the natural 
(though, strictly speaking, of course, substantia is 
a foreign term in Marxist vocabulary). Neomarx- 
ists treat practice as the materialist equivalent 
(“the rational kernel” as they style it) of Hegelian 
“identity of being and consciousness”. Though 
mediated by thought (“the ideal”), practice as the 
world-transforming activity is essentially materi­
al because it is, on the one hand, subject to objec­
tive laws of external reality and is, on the other 
hand, exercised in socially determined forms.
The Nature and Genesis of Consciousness. The 
capacity to be guided by the laws of some other 
nature and not just by the intrinsic laws of one’s 
own nature is the differentia specifica of human 
beings that distinguishes them from animals. For 
this to be possible, however, this extrinsic law 
must be known (whereas intrinsic laws require no 
mediation of knowledge to be effective). Knowl­
edge and, more generally, consciousness are thus 
central to distinguishing between the social and 
the natural. This sounded suspiciously “idealis­
tic”, but Neomarxists held (justly, it seems) that 
materialism would never be truly substantiated 
until it came with a convincing hypothesis of the 
origins of consciousness, considering Marxists’ 
uncompromising refusal to include the latter 
among the world’s “primary” elements that might 
be safely “taken for granted”.
Consciousness is, somewhat circularly (or 
should we rather say -  dialectically), explained by 
Neomarxists in social or, to be more specific, in 
communicational terms, viz. as a product of com­
munication mediated by specific external objects 
-  tools (undeniably, a “legitimate” Marxist topic). 
For tools are essentially things molded to fit ex­
ternal reality: they would be useless unless they
“reflected” the relevant objective characteristics 
of the would-be “targets” (as would be futile, for 
example, to attempt to draw water in a sieve). In 
this they are a kind of “material (tangible) ideal”, 
“protoconcepts” in stone, or “words of the real-life 
language”, as Mikhailov puts it1.
But tools, of course, are possessed of no con­
sciousness of their own, no more so than printed 
words in a book. In human communication medi­
ated by the use of tools, however (i.e. in collective 
work), the latter operate as double-faced signs: 
on the one hand, tools “represent” (“stand for”, 
“symbolise”) the objects they are used to modi­
fy, on the other hand, they “represent” the social 
practices, and with them the newly acquired so­
cialised properties, of those who use them, in­
cluding “the self”.
For the riddle of self is the riddle of reflection, 
of this peculiar capacity to view oneself as if from 
the outside, as if one were a different being. This 
is only possible if one can truly encounter oneself 
as something (or somebody) different from self, 
encounter something or somebody that is both 
self and non-self. This “dialectical” requirement is 
met by only one instance, viz. some other person 
(some other self) provided his/her activities are 
at the same time my activities. No one’s natural 
activities can, however, be also my activities, just 
like my natural activities can never be also some­
one else’s activities, even if the two are identical, 
for we cannot “represent” (“stand for”) each other 
in our natural functions: I would not get rid of my 
hunger and my thirst if somebody ate or drank in 
my stead, nor would anyone be able to beget (or 
carry) my children for me. And only our mutual 
activities mediated and “conditioned” by the use 
of an external thing different from but common 
to both my counterpart and myself result in a sit­
uation in which reflection and self-consciousness 
are possible.
The importance of self-consciousness lies in 
the fact that only insofar as I am conscious of my­
self, i.e. capable of distinguishing between self 
and non-self, can I also be cognisant of non-self, 
can apprehend the outer world as something that 
exists and is possessed of properties in and for  
itself and not just as a part or aspect of my sub­
jective world. Self-consciousness is thus a neces­
sary prerequisite for overcoming what might be 
called a natural solipsist attitude. Insofar as they
1 See https://www.marxists.org/archive/mikhailov/works 
riddle/riddleSb.htm
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“reflect” objective properties of other things, “rep­
resent” them in forms different from the original 
ones (“idealised”), tools prove instrumental in the 
understanding of the objective world, too. And 
objective knowledge (“cognised necessity”) pro­
duces an entirely new situation: it allows to tran­
scend the limits of natural life and makes free ac­
tivity and creativity possible.
Alienation. For the majority of human be­
ings, however, this freedom remains a remote or, 
worse still, a denied possibility. In class society 
the “transparency” of social relations is lost and 
people are subject to irrational external forces, 
only in this case social rather than natural. This 
enslavement of man by forces and circumstanc­
es created by himself is what Marx called “alien­
ation”. Alienation deprives man of his superior 
capacities and his creative potential, reduces him
to the state of a mere appliance of that grand sur- 
plus-value producing machine society becomes 
under capitalism. It obliterates his unique talents 
in favour of standardised skills -  very much like 
in market economy goods’ intrinsic qualities dis­
appear in the abstract category of “value”.
Overcoming alienation is the primary goal at 
the present stage of human development. To be­
come truly and fully free man must subdue social 
elements as he has subdued (to some extent) nat­
ural ones. This is to be achieved through under­
standing the laws of social reality (here Marx’s 
contribution was, presumably, decisive) and us­
ing this knowledge to establish a social order that 
would henceforth be under man’s conscious con­
trol (implying, to be sure, a Communist society). 
In this Ilyenkov and his collaborators remained 
quite orthodox, indeed.
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